The Best of Many Worlds, or, is Quantum Decoherence the Manifestation of a Disposition?∗ by Boge, Florian J.
The Best of Many Worlds, or, is antum
Decoherence the Manifestation of a
Disposition?∗
Florian J. Boge
Abstract In this paper I investigate whether the phenomenon of quantum deco-
herence, the vanishing of interference and detectable entanglement on quantum
systems in virtue of interactions with the environment, can be understood as the
manifestation of a disposition. I will highlight the advantages of this approach as
a realist interpretation of the quantum formalism, and demonstrate how such an
approach can benet from advances in the metaphysics of dispositions. I will also
confront some commonalities with and dierences to the many worlds interpreta-
tion, and address the diculties induced by quantum non-locality. I conclude that
there are ways to deal with these issues and that the proposal hence is an avenue
worth pursuing.
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1 Introduction: The Decoherence Mechanism and the Problem
of its Interpretation
In quantum theory (QT), the state of a system  is famously described by a (time-dependent)
state vector |(푡)⟩, an element of a suitable complex vector space . Vectors can be super-
posed to give new vectors; |(푡)⟩ might have an expansion as 훼1(푡) |표1⟩ + 훼2(푡) |표2⟩ + … =∑푗 훼푖(푡) |표푗⟩, and the |표푘⟩ might be eigenstates of some observable (measurable quantity) 푂,
i.e. states in which 푂 is standardly taken to assume denite value 표푘 on  .
Quantum superposition is the origin of all troubles arising in the interpretation of the for-
malism: It gures in interference phenomena, non-commutativity of observables, entangle-
ment, and the non-classical probabilistic structure of the theory. Worse: allowing that some
∗This is a pre-print version of an article accepted by Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. The
accepted version includes minor changes.
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macroscopic measuring device could be described by QT as well (why would it not, if all its
elementary components can?), the joint evolution of  and  would formally proceed as|(푡)⟩ |0(푡)⟩ = ∑푗 훼푗(푡) |푗⟩ |0(푡)⟩↦ ∑푗 훼̃푗(푡′) |푗⟩ |푗⟩ ,
where 푡 < 푡′, |0(푡)⟩ is a ‘ready state’, and typically 훼̃푗(푡′) ≠ 훼푗(푡′). This is one version of the
so called measurement problem, as  is now entangled with  and superposed w.r.t. a range
of possible measurement outcomes.
Decoherence theory puts a stop to at least part of the madness. Assuming that the environment is in some state |0⟩, the joint evolution of ,  , and  from 푡′ to 푡′′ > 푡′ is∑푗 훼̃푗(푡′) |푗⟩ |푗⟩ |0(푡′)⟩↦ ∑푗 ̃̃훼푗(푡′′)⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟=∶훽푗 (푡′′) |푗⟩ |푗⟩ |푗⟩ .
Writing this in the density matrix-formalism (and renaming 푡′′ ↦ 푡), one can now eliminate again to obtain an eective state for  and  only:휌̂ = tr 휌̂ = ∑푖,푗 훽푖훽∗푗 |푖⟩⟨푗 | ⊗ |푖⟩⟨푗 | ⟨푗 |푖⟩푡푡↦푡+훿≈ ∑푗 |훽푗 |2 |푗⟩⟨푗 | ⊗ |푗⟩⟨푗 | , (1)
where the approximation holds after a short time span (훿) if one can justify that ⟨푗 |푖⟩푡 → 0
for 푖 ≠ 푗 as time increases. This is possible for scenarios ranging from scattering to magnetiza-
tion, and has lead to the testable and tested prediction of decoherence times (cf. Joos et al., 2003;
Schlosshauer, 2007).
Decoherence has a bunch of merits: it singles out a preferred basis of the joint space⊗,
and thereby eliminates the so called preferred basis problem (e.g. Schlosshauer, 2007, p. 54),
the problem that even a joint state of  and  remains ambiguous due to the possibility of
basis changes. Assuming, moreover, that the |푘⟩⟨푘 | decompose some (coarse) observable1푂 = ∑푗 표푗 |푗⟩⟨푗 | and the |푘⟩⟨푘 | some pointer observable 푋 = ∑푗 푥푗 |푗⟩⟨푗 |, these ob-
servables will be stable under the continuing interaction with the environment, and in this
sense be preferred as well (e.g. Schlosshauer, 2007, p. 77). Most importantly, ‘any interaction
described by a potential 푉 (푟) is diagonal in position, hence position is always the distinguished
“observable” measured by the interaction [...].’ (Joos et al., 2003, p. 55; original emphasis) But
the localization thus achieved will usually be suciently coarse so as to also allow for the si-
multaneous ascription of coarse momenta.2 Hence coarse positions and momenta are usually
preferred observables, and in this sense, decoherence may be said to “recover classicality” (cf.
Joos et al. 2003, pp. 64 .; Schlosshauer 2007, pp. 115 .).
Decoherence also justies talk of an “eective collapse” to the extent that it corresponds to
a
1For simplicity I allow to sometimes merge operators and observables notationally, while they should of course
be strictly separated conceptually.
2Recall that position and momentum are non-commuting observables, and that a position eigenstate |푥⟩ has an
expansion proportional to ∫ d푝 푒−푖푝푥 |푝⟩, whence it is a superposition of momentum eigenstates.
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practically irreversible delocalization of phase relations into the composite system-
environment state induced by inevitable and ubiquitous environmental monitor-
ing [...] [and] leads to eectively nonunitary dynamics for the local system that
may manifest themselves (for example) in the decay of interference patterns [...].
(Schlosshauer, 2007, p. 69; rst emphases added, second in original)
Inquiring on small fragments of the environment (e.g. the laboratory equipment) of a de-
cohered state, one will quickly obtain virtually all available information about the system,
whereas for other, random quantum states, this does not hold (cf. Zurek, 2009). In this sense,
decoherence ‘mimics’ the dynamics of a collapse mechanism.
There are, however, some serious drawbacks. The result in (1), for instance, looks like a
statistical mixture, which could be interpreted as an expression of ignorance about the joint
system’s true quantum state |푗⟩⟨푗 | ⊗ |푗⟩⟨푗 |. But this mixture is improper, as it arises
by neglect of  , not by statistical weighting. And in principle, observables can be dened
which would expose dierences between the two in the long-run (cf. d’Espagnat, 1990, p. 1154
.). There is, moreover, the possibility of recoherence in (1), i.e. of the reoccurrence of mea-
surable interference, which can nicely be demonstrated on systems like atoms in a cavity (cf.
Schlosshauer, 2007, p. 257 and references therein).
So we cannot interpret 휌̂ as an expression of ignorance, and we do not retrieve one (joint)
state for  andwith denite values for 푂 and 푋 respectively from the decoherence process.
The following comment by Bell (1990, p. 25) hits the mark:
The idea that elimination of coherence, in one way or another, implies the replace-
ment of “and” by “or”, is a very common one among solvers of the “measurement
problem”. It has always puzzled me.
Decoherence also does not t nicely with most interpretations of QT (such as collapse mod-
els or Bohmian theories) that manage to replace the “and” by an “or” by other means (cf.
Schlosshauer, 2004, pp. 1291 .). The currently most popular way to circumvent the prob-
lem is the many worlds interpretation (MWI), which loosely says that the“and” persists, and
that decoherence merely denes dierent branches of a “multiverse”, that will afterwards be
more or less independent (e.g. Saunders et al., 2010; Wallace, 2012).
The MWI, however, still faces a probability problem, as it is dicult to reconcile with the
probabilistic content of QT, i.e. Born’s rule, stating that the probability of measuring 표푘 for 푂
on  in state |(푡)⟩ = ∑푗 훼푖(푡) |표푗⟩ at time 푡 is |훼푗(푡)|2. Approaches that appeal to decoherence
to derive the Born rule are threatened by circularity (cf. Baker, 2007), and rely on axioms that
are hard to defend (cf. Maudlin 2014, p. 804; Dizadji-Bahmani 2013; ref. blinded, pp. 259-60).
Other approaches assume a well dened number of branches (e.g. Zurek, 2005; Carroll and
Sebens, 2014), which seems incompatible with the decoherence mechanism and the standard
probability calculus (cf. Wallace, 2012, p. 120).
Another alternative are “anti-realist” interpretations like Healey’s pragmatist approach, ac-
cording to which ‘decoherence involves a physical process’, but ‘a system’s quantum state’ does
not ‘describe or represent properties of systems involved in such a process.’ (Healey, 2012, p.
1538; original emphasis) Healey, however, remains vague on issues like the process involved
in but not described by decoherence, questions of semantics, or what “physical reality” even
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means, given that quantum theory is not descriptive, and that we also lack other means for a
fundamental description (cf. Bell, 1964; Pusey et al., 2012; Colbeck and Renner, 2012; Hardy,
2013).
There seem to be three principled options: (a) go into an even more anti-realist direction than
Healey and answer all questions by recursion to epistemological concerns alone (as suggested
e.g. in ref. blinded, ch. 5), (b) advance a satisfying account of the quantum probabilities within
the MWI, or (c) reconcile decoherence with some realist alternative to the MWI. In this paper
I am going to pursue the third option, along a path that today has become rather marginal in
the debate.3
CAVEAT: My approach will be quite ‘Viking’, in the sense of French (2014), meaning that I
“ruthlessly plunder” the metaphysics of dispositions-debate without respecting boundaries (of
worked-out metaphysical positions), and without necessarily giving anything back.
2 Decoherence as Manifestation
2.1 From Heisenberg’s Potentialities to the Metaphysics of Dispositions
The locus classicus of allusions to modal notions in the interpretation of QT are certainly the
philosophical writings of Heisenberg. He in particular claimed that ‘if one considers the word
“state” as describing some potentiality rather than a reality [...] then the concept of “coexistent
potentialities” is quite plausible,’ and that ‘the atoms or the elementary particles themselves
[...] form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than one of things or facts.’ (Heisen-
berg, 1958, pp. 159-60; emphasis added) He also believed that the Born probabilities expressed
‘statements about possibilities or better tendencies (“potentia” in Aristotelian philosphy), and
these statements are completely objective, they do not depend on any observer[...].’ (Heisen-
berg, 1958, p. 53) As Friederich (2013, p. 94) points out, this ‘is very much in spirit with what
is nowadays called the “propensity interpretation” of probability’, most commonly associated
with Popper (1957).
Like Heisenberg, Popper (1990, 1957) uses the term “tendencies”, but there are discernible
dierences between both positions: In his early works, Popper (1957, p. 68; emphasis omit-
ted) believed that ‘the propensity interpretation [...] takes the mystery out of quantum theory,
while leaving probability and indeterminism in it.’ He compared the change of the state vector
in a double slit experiment with one slit closed to ‘the shifting of a pin on a pin board’ meaning
that ‘[e]very change in the experimental arrangement such as the shutting of a slit, will lead to
a dierent distribution of weights to the possibilities[...].’ (Popper, 1957, p. 69; emphasis omit-
ted) And he also ‘stressed that the propensities are not only as objective as the experimental
arrangements but also physically real—in the sense in which forces, and elds of forces, are
physically real.’ (ibid.; original emphasis)
Heisenberg (1958, p. 54), in contrast, spoke of a ‘transition from the “possible” to the “actual”’
that ‘takes place as soon as the interaction of the object with the measuring device, and thereby
with the rest of the world, has come into play[...]’; and he found that ‘physicists have gradually
3Of course there are appeals to dispositions in parts of the debate (e.g. Dorato and Esfeld, 2010; Esfeld et al., 2014;
Egg and Esfeld, 2015), but these are typically formulated against the background of another realist interpretation
such as Bohmian Mechanics or some objective collapse model.
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become accustomed to considering the electronic orbits, etc., not as reality but rather as a kind
of “potentia”.’ (Heisenberg, 1958, p. 156; empahsis added)
Popper, in fact, also radically changed his understanding of propensities over time: ‘Popper’s
later view[...] on propensity[...] retains from the earlier Popper objective singular probabilities,
but abandons the association of propensities with repeatable conditions. Instead propensities
are associated with states of the universe.’ (Gillies, 2000, p. 822) In 1990, Popper expressed the
conviction ‘that propensities should not be regarded as properties inherent in an object, such as
a die or a penny, but that they should be regarded as inherent in a situation [...].’ (Popper, 1990,
p. 14) This is to be contrasted, e.g., with von Mises (1957, p. 12; emphasis added), who allowed
that ‘[t]he probability of a 6 is a physical property of a given die and is a property analogous to
its mass, specic heat, or electrical resistance.’
This change in Popper’s views was not without consequence: his allusions to the solution
of all of QT’s mysteries by propensities are quite faint in his 1990, and they play a subordinate
role therein. In particular, the mentions of QT here almost exclusively concern issues of deter-
minism (cf. pp. 15-7). Suárez (2009, pp. 503-4), moreover, recovers ‘three lethal objections’ form
the literature, ‘that render it [Popper’s interpretation at any time – FJB] untenable.’ In short
they are that (i) Popper cannot properly distinguish superpositions and mixed states since he
identies propensities with probabilities, that he (ii) cannot really account for interference after
all, and that (iii) propensities are time-asymmetric while (the relevant) conditional probabilities
are not, whence the identication of propensities and probabilities becomes problematic in the
rst place.
Heisenberg (1958, p. 53), on the other hand, allowed that a probability assignment in QT also
‘contains statements about our knowledge of the system, which of course are subjective in so
far as they may be dierent for dierent observers.’ Because of this ‘omelette that nobody has
seen how to unscramble’ (Jaynes, 1990, p. 381), Friederich (2013, p. 87; original emphasis), for
instance, reads Heisenberg as an ‘opportunistic thinker, whose remarks on the interpretation of
quantum mechanics are mainly motivated by dialectical purposes and do not lead to a coherent
foundational perspective.’ From neither Popper’s nor Heisenberg’s thinking hence emerges a
view of propensities that allows for a clear understanding of the quantum formalism, useful
for solving the measurement problem.
Margenau (1954) probably came the farthest in advancing such a view.4 He suggested to
distinguish between
possessed and latent observables. Possessed are those, like mass and charge of an
electron, whose values are “intrinsic,” do not vary except in a continuous manner,
as for example the mass does with changing velocity. The others are quantized,
have eigenvalues, are subject to the uncertainty principle, manifest themselves as
clearly present only upon measurement. I believe they are “not always there,” that
they take on values when an act of measurement, a perception, forces them out of
indiscriminacy or latency. (Margenau, 1954, p. 270; original emphasis)
So like von Mises, Margenau is willing to locate propensities in the objects, not experimental
setups or the entire universe. But he relies exclusively on measurement – or even perception –
4Cf. also Suárez (2007, pp. 419 .) for an appraisal.
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to carry the ‘latency’ over into deniteness. His views thus fall prey to standard problems, like
Wigner’s friend (Wigner, 1961, p. 873).5
Propensities have been identied as a specic kind of dispositions (cf. Popper 1957, pp. 67 and
68; Mumford 1998, p. 11; Ellis 2001, p. 129), dispositions which are not ‘sure re’ (Mumford,
1998, ibid.) but rather ‘stochastic’ (Ellis, 2001, ibid.; emphasis omitted). Dispositions, in turn, are
characterized as properties thatmanifest themselves only under appropriate stimulus conditions
(e.g. Mumford 1998, pp. 6 .; Molnar 2003, p. 84). As is well known, the precise logical analysis
of this natural language description is a troubling endeavor (e.g. Mumford 1998, pp. 36 .;
Martin 2008, pp. 12 .). But the intuitive level suces to make some sense in the quantum
context.
As a rst step, we can use it to invalidate Popper’s claims to the need of involving an entire
experimental setup or even the rest of the universe in the ascription of propensities. Popper
(1990, p. 15), namely,
pointed out that the propensity of a penny to fall on a at table with heads up
is obviously modied if the table top is appropriately slotted. Similarly, one and
the same loaded die will have dierent propensities if the table top is very elastic
rather than of marble, or if it is covered by a layer of sand.
Now a penny will have some tendency to land heads, some tendency to land tails, and some
tendency to land on its side in circumstances with or without slots on the table. Clearly, these
tendencies will not be identical for both cases. But does that mean that the dispositions of the
penny themselves, i.e. its very properties which make it so that it stochastically exhibits one
of these behaviors, are changed as well? As can be seen, I am inclined, against Popper and
like Margenau or von Mises, to view propensities as properties of the object in question alone.
Then in this sense, the propensities of the penny could be said to remain entirely invariant
under the change of the table, while their tendency to manifest would be altered, resulting in
the dierent observed frequencies in both setups. In other words: the stimulus conditions gure
in the determination of the strengths of an object’s tendencies to manifest certain propensities,
but they do not alter the propensities themselves.
I hence suggest some non-standard terminology here,6 thereby separating the two notions
(tendency and propensity) in meaning. This not only avoids Popper’s problematic confusion
of propensities and probabilities, but also ts more naturally with a realistic reading of the
quantum formalism in terms of dispositions, as we shall see.
2.2 Mutual Manifestation
Equation (1) left us with something akin to a statistical mixture of states, which, however,
could not be interpreted directly in terms of ignorance. I want to suggest that the traditional
proposals about propensities guring in the interpretation of QT, together with some advances
5Remarkably even Wigner, referring back to Zeh’s seminal (1970) paper on decoherence, later wrote: ‘For some
time I believed that the mere phenomenon of the observation of the outcomes of measurements shows [...]
[that there are] phenomena which are still outside of physics’ interest[.] This has been at least supercially
eliminated by Zeh’s observation[...].’ (Wigner, 1986, p. 379)
6E.g. Vetter (2015, pp. 63 .) for a similar move w.r.t. potentialities and dispositions.
6
in the metaphysics of dispositions, can be put in the service of understanding decoherence as
an “eective collapse theory”.
The basic proposal is simple: A system  ’s loss of interference due to decoherence, together
with the empirical fact that only one value, 표, out of a range of possible values for observable푂 is observed on  in a given experiment, somehow corresponds to the manifestation of a
disposition, the disposition to exhibit 푂() ≈ 표 under suitable environmental conditions, with
frequencies predicted by the Born rule . This would acknowledge the central role of the Born
probabilities right away, make our non-acquaintance with macroscopic superpositions under-
standable, and remove the “ontological excess baggage”7 of multiple, more or less independent
“branches”. But how exactly should this be understood?
Before I go into the intricacies, let me rst draw attention to a feature of the entangling
interaction leading to decoherence that can be understood quite well by appeal to a disposi-
tionalist lingo. A standard conviction in the decoherence literature is that the reason that the
environment8 appears to us entirely “classical” lies in the fact that the systems within it will
mutually decohere each other:
For example, the gravitational interaction between the earth and the moon leads
rapidly to mutual decoherence. Similarly, a charge can show only a limited coher-
ence range in the presence of other charges [...]. (Joos et al., 2003, p. 55; emphasis
added)
The reason is clear enough: the symmetry properties of an entangled state of multiple inter-
acting (elementary) systems allow to single out any one of them as the system of interest, and
to observe, by partial tracing, the vanishing of coherence on it.
A similar kind of reciprocity has been acknowledged the metaphysics of dispositions: C. B.
Martin, in particular, suggests to think of an object with a certain disposition and the appro-
priate stimulus conditions as ‘reciprocal disposition partners for a mutual manifestation[...].’
(Martin, 2008, p. 3; emphasis added) While Martin’s own writings are sometimes a bit opaque,
the idea is nicely illustrated by Mumford and Anjum (2011, p. 34) as follows:
Instead of thinking, for instance, of water having a power to dissolve salt, we
should think of water and salt as mutual manifestation partners whose manifesta-
tion is the production of saline solution. And two objects manifest their gravita-
tional mass – a disposition to attract – only in tandem.
Not only is salt soluble, but water also dissolving. Viewing both as ‘reciprocal disposition
partners’ and the stimulus conditions as mutual, both these intuitions can be captured at the
same time.
That the situation is remarkably similar for decohering interactions can be illustrated on a
simple model of spins decohered by an environment of other spins (Zurek, 1982).9 The Hamil-
7I misappropriate the term from Hardy (2004).
8Above I have talked, as is standard practice, of a threefold distinction between systems involved in the decoher-
ence process: some microscopic system  , a macroscopic measuring device, and the environment  . Clearly, could be construed as part of  , as  will (usually) contain all sorts of macroscopic systems. I will hence
largely omit talk of a measuring device below.
9I here closely follow Schlosshauer’s (2007, pp. 89 .) exposition.
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tonian of the interaction is here given as퐻̂int = 12 휎̂ (0)푧 ⊗ 푁∑푖=1 휇푖휎̂ (푖)푧 ⨂푗≠푖 1푗 = 퐻̂int ⊗ 퐻̂int , (2)
where 휎̂ (푘)푧 is the Pauli-푧-martix acting on the space of the 푘th system, 1푘 is the identity operator
acting on that space, and the 휇푘 are interaction constants. Eigenstates of 퐻̂int will be product
states of spins up or down along the 푧-axis, like |푛⟩ = |↑1⟩ |↓2⟩… |↓푁 ⟩, and the associated
energies will be 휖푛 = ∑푁푗=1(−1)푚푗휇푗 , where 푚푘 = 0 if spin 푘 is up along 푧 and 1 if it is down.
Simple combinatorics tells us that there will be 2푁 possible such states, so we can let 푛 range
from 1 to 2푁 .
Assuming that  is initially in a superposition |(0)⟩ = 훼 |↑0⟩ + 훽 |↓0⟩ and  in |(0)⟩ =∑2푁푛=1 훾푛 |푛⟩, the joint evolution given by 푈̂ (푡) = exp(− 횤ℏ 퐻̂int푡)will eect a coupling 훼 |↑0⟩ |1(푡)⟩+훽 |↓0⟩ |2(푡)⟩, where|1(푡)⟩ = 2푁∑푛=1 훾푛푒− 횤2ℏ 휖푛푡 |푛⟩ , |2(푡)⟩ = 2푁∑푛=1 훾푛푒 횤2ℏ 휖푛푡 |푛⟩ . (3)
Tracing out the environment leads to the eective density matrix휌̂ (푡) = |훼 |2 |↑0⟩⟨↑0| + |훽 |2 |↓0⟩⟨↓0| + 훼훽∗푑(푡) |↑0⟩⟨↓0| + 훼 ∗훽푑 ∗(푡) |↓0⟩⟨↑0| , (4)
where 푑(푡) = ⟨1(푡)|2(푡)⟩ = ∑2푁푛=1 |훾푛 |2푒− 횤ℏ 휖푛푡 is sometimes called a decoherence factor. Since
at any 푡 , 푑(푡) corresponds to the addition of 2푁 vectors of lengths |훾푛 |2 rotating in the com-
plex plane with frequencies 휖푛/ℏ, the analysis of 푑(푡) can be understood in terms of a two-
dimensional random walk, where direction and length of the step are given by orientation and
length of the vectors at 푡 respectively. Since ∑2푁푛=1 |훾푛 |2 = 1, the average step length will be 2−푁
from which it follows that ⟨|푑(푡)|⟩ ∝ 2−푁 . It can be shown, furthermore, that for a broad range
of distributions of the 휇푖 and 푁 large enough 푑(푡) ≈ 푒−Γ2푡2 , where Γ2 depends on the initial state
and the distribution of the 휇푖 (cf. Schlosshauer, 2007, pp. 91-2 and references therein for the
details). In other words: for large enough 푁 휌̂ (푡) will approximate a mixture of states |↑0⟩⟨↑0|
and |↓0⟩⟨↓0| with weights |훼 |2 and |훽 |2 as 푡 increases. This is decoherence in action.
But the crucial thing to realize, for the present purposes, is that the relevant states |1(푡)⟩ , |2(푡)⟩
from which the decohering behavior can be derived develop in virtue of the interaction of 
with  . In other words: there will be a change in the environmental spins,  , in the presence
of the additional spin,  , and that change of  in virtue of the interaction with  is essential
for decoherence to take place. Hence, just as salt and water mutually manifest their solving
and dissolving behaviors to give rise to a solvent do single and environmental spins mutually
manifest their decohered and decohering behaviors.
2.3 No “or” form an “and”: Continuous Manifestation and the Removal of
Collapse
Appeal to mutual manifestation gives rst credence to decoherence having to do with the man-
ifestation of dispositions. But it clearly does not solve the central problem of any realist inter-
pretation of QT: the measurement problem. In |(0)⟩ = 훼 |↑0⟩ + 훽 |↓0⟩,  has a disposition
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to spin along the 푧 axis, which could manifest as spinning-up along 푧 or as spinning-down
along 푧 (it is not sure re). And  will manifest its 푧-spinning behavior under suitable cir-
cumstances, such as |1(푡)⟩ and |2(푡)⟩, as |↑0⟩ and |↓0⟩ respectively.10 But the entangled
state 훼 |↑0⟩ |1(푡)⟩ + 훽 |↓0⟩ |2(푡)⟩ still has both situations occur. So according to the quantum
formalism (read dispositionally), both these dispositions will manifest at the same time. This is
problematic, as we retrieve nothing but a many worlds-story with a dispositionalist touch, and
all the problems associated with probability remain.
What is still missing here is ‘the selection step’ (Fuchs and Schack, 2012, p. 245) , the ‘“se-
lection” of one of the entangled state’s components’ which ‘singles out a particular measure-
ment result.’ (ibid.) Simply adding a spontaneous ‘jump’ into one of the multiple possibilities
amounts to nothing but the plain old, minimalist Dirac-von Neumann interpretation, which
raises all sorts of further questions (e.g. Bub, 1997, pp. 31-2). The question is whether a disposi-
tionalist account can somehow “fake”, and hence do away with the need for a proper selection
step. I think that the answer is “yes”, but it requires some eort.
Now recall, rst of all, that while decoherence does not lead to a proper collapse, it at least
selects a preferred basis and thereby reduces the system’s “dispositional freedom”, if you will.
Since basically any old interaction will induce such reductions, this leads me to the following
“rst axiom” for a dispositionalist analysis:
(DA1) Only perfectly isolated systems instantiate collections of entirely non-
manifest dispositions. Any interaction will impinge on the non-manifestness. Am-
biguity due to the possibility of basis changes indicates that the system has dispo-
sitions w.r.t. values of all measurable quantities, even non-comeasurable ones.
I should explain a little. Take the prime example of non-comeasurable observables, position푥 and momentum 푝, with commutator [푥, 푝] = −횤ℏ. This commutator leads to the infamous
Heisenberg uncertainty relation Δ푥Δ푝 ≥ ℏ2 , connected to the fact that any more precise po-
sition measurement cannot reveal much about momentum, and vice versa. A free, spinless
system will have a state with position representation 휓 (x) = ∫ d3푝 휓̃ (p)푒 횤ℏxp, where the mo-
mentum representation 휓̃ (p) is given, by Fourier transformation (which amounts to a “basis
change”), as 휓̃ (p) = ∫ d3푥 휓 (x)푒− 횤ℏxp. On the dispositionalist account, we can be esh this
out to mean that the system has propensities for showing up in any volume in the support of휓 (x) and for exhibiting any momentum that lies in the support of 휓̃ (p), with tendencies of
strengths |휓 (x)|2 d3푥 and |휓̃ (p)|2 d3푝 respectively; but that no precise values of localization and
momentum will ever manifest simultaneously in any measurement or like situation.
In the context of decoherence, the most important application of spatial wavefunctions are
certainly scattering scenarios (e.g. Schlosshauer, 2007, pp. 119 .). Here the dynamics of a
density matrix 휌(x′,x) = ⟨x′|휌̂|x⟩ (which for a pure state is just 휓 (x′)휓 ∗(x)) is governed by a
dierential equation that leads to the vanishing of 휌(x′,x) for x′ ≠ x, just as |↑0⟩⟨↓0|, say, will
vanish in (4) for 푡 ⟶ ∞. To appreciate this, let me propose the following “second axiom”:
(DA2) In decoherence, the stimulus conditions are such that all the dispositions
associated with an observable will manifest.
10In this sense, the propensity to exhibit 푧-spinning behavior could also be thought of as ‘multi-track’ (cf. Ellis and
Lierse, 1994, p. 29).
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For both these situations, we hence need to deal with the fact that 휌(x′,x) and |↑0⟩⟨↓0| would
still be present for 푡 < ∞, and with the fact that 휌(x′,x′)would still be present in the nal state
at “푡 = ∞” even if the system was measured to be at x ≠ x′, as would |↓0⟩⟨↓0| in (4) if the
system was measured to have spin up.
I think that what Hüttemann (2004, cf. p. 19) calls continuously manifestable dispositions
(CMDs) here comes to good use. Hüttemann (ibid.) introduces CMDs to understand how laws
of nature can be approximately true in virtue of the manifestations of dispositions. For in-
stance, by a physical law, the specic heat 푐푉 of a crystal is given as a function of the phonon
density and the temperature, and the law strictly speaking applies to an ideal crystal only. But
determining the amount of impurities in some set of samples and then ordering them accord-
ing to purity one may extrapolate the behavior to infer that in the ideal case the law actually
holds. Hence Hüttemann (2004, p. 20; emphasis added) has it ‘that the disposition’ to exhibit
a particular value for the specic heat in accordance with the law ‘is partially manifest in the
non-ideal situation and that the transition from the less than ideal to the ideal is continuous so
as to allow for extrapolation.’
Appeal to CMDs in the analysis of quantum decoherence allows us to remove both the selec-
tion step and the many worlds that make a coherent understanding of the quantum probabili-
ties so dicult, along the following lines. As long as the dispositions associated with a system’s
quantum state are “all on an equal footing”, they can properly interfere with one another, in
accordance with Heisensberg’s thinking. This is especially the case before any decoherence
has taken place, in accordance with (DA1). When decoherence then takes place, ‘[t]he envi-
ronment, composed of many subsystems, acts as an amplifying, higher-order measuring device
for the state of the system [...].’ (Schlosshauer, 2007, p. 69; emphasis added) This will happen in
a continuous fashion, meaning that e.g. the ability of the two states |↑0⟩ and |↓0⟩ to interfere
with one another is gradually—albeit usually quite quickly—reduced over time. And the eect
of this process will usually also depend on some suitable quantity determining the system’s
ability to interact with the “environment” (like its internal energy; cf. the plots of visibility of
“fringes” in Brune et al. 1996, p. 4889 and in Arndt et al. 2001).
Since (selective) measurements on a decohered state will, however, unambiguously indicate
one out of the many values the system is disposed to exhibit, only one of these dispositions must
have been amplied so much as to become detectable. The remainder, in contrast, can only be
present ‘latently’, to borrow Margenau’s term; but it must be still so present, as evidenced by
recoherence. Hence thinking, say, of “spin up” and “spin down” along some direction as CMDs,
this means that “spin up” might be manifest to a high degree, under suitable environmental
conditions, but that “spin down” would be manifest at the same time, albeit to a far lesser
degree.
Let us introduce some terminology, to present things more cogently. I suggest to call the
disposition which has been amplied so much as to lead to the observable behavior dominant
or dominantly manifest. The remainder we may call eectively latent. The crucial thing to
realize is that they are all manifest once decoherence has occurred, but not all to the same
degree. The gradual vanishing of interference fringes and the possibility of recoherence, which
has been experimentally veried even on relatively large objects (e.g. Raimond et al., 1997),
urges that this picture is preferred over Margenau’s. The Born rule weights then obtain a
direct and crucial meaning: they quantify the tendency of each of an observable’s values to
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become dominant, so as to determine the system’s observable behavior. Decoherence factors
and their vanishing, moreover, can then be read as quantifying the “struggle for dominance” in
this process, and the fact that the “winner” will not be “bothered by the losers” anymore, after
some (short) time.
This leads me to the “third axiom”, which removes the tension created by DA2:
(DA3) In the manifestation process represented by the decoherence mechanism,
only one out of all the manifesting dispositions will manifest dominantly, and the
Born probabilities quantify each disposition’s tendency to do so. The remainder
will become eectively latent, thereby not contributing to observable behavior. De-
coherence factors quantify the tendency for swaps in dominance, which becomes
almost negligible for most larger systems after very short times.
Now Hüttemann (2004, p. 21; original emphasis) urges that the use of the word ‘“continuity”
[...] is not meant to imply that the manifestation of a disposition is a process that takes some
time’, since while he does ‘not deny that there might be such manifestation processes,’ he
is ‘interested in [...] manifestation as the product of such a process.’ These considerations
transfer reasonably well to the case of decoherence. Clearly, there are interactions at play
in decoherence, whose dynamics is described by a (continuous) unitary evolution. But it is
not the continuity of these processes which determines e.g. the ‘sharpness’ of localization in
the scattering case, but rather the number number of scatterings in a certain time interval
(cf. Schlosshauer, 2007, p. 127). Thus, the degree of manifestation may vary in a(n almost)
continuous fashion in decoherence as well,11 and it is the result of a certain (set of) continuous
process(es).
In summary, Heisenberg’s transition from the possible to the actual is, on the account estab-
lished, always gradual; and Margenau’s step out of latency is never perfect nor at all triggered
by conscious observation per se, but rather by physical interactions that stimulate mutual man-
ifestation. Moreover, while the dispositions in question are strictly inherent in objects, not
setups, Popper was at least half right in that the precise frequencies deriving from the asso-
ciated tendencies, and quantied by the Born rule weights, will depend on both system and
environment (ultimately the entire universe).
3 Open estions
3.1 Minds and Worlds
The foregoing considerations lay a reasonable foundation for an interpretation of decoherence
in terms of dispositions. However, the fact that the dispositions involved in some quantum state
will all manifest to some degree, on my account, makes it still unpleasantly reminiscent of a
11The vanishing of interference terms in scattering scenarios is in fact usually described by a dierential equation,
which indeed suggests a continuous process. The derivation however involves a couple of “tricks” and ideal-
izations such as a move from a discrete to a continuous range of possible scattered momenta (cf. Schlosshauer,
2007, p. 125). That a continuum of degrees of manifestation is established in the sense of interpolation, as with
Hüttenann’s example of the specic heat, can also be seen from typical plots (e.g. Brune et al., 1996; Arndt et al.,
2001).
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crude version of the MWI. As in the MWI, the entire content of a decohered state is not merely
possible but somewhat actual. And there will be a loss of interference, so that the dierent
dispositions may be said to be “branching”, in a loose manner of speaking. But the thing that is
missing for my dispositional account to collapse into the MWI is the association of additional
consciousnesses with those dispositions that become eectively latent.
To see the point more clearly, let us briey assess the role of consciousness in the MWI.
Maybe the most detailed assessment of this issue is Albert and Loewer (1988, pp. 206-7), who
introduced the many minds view of the MWI: ‘every observer[...] has associated with it not
a single mind but rather an innite set of minds’, and the Born probability, derived from the
squared modulus of a coecient of some state in a superposition, ‘is a measure of the “propor-
tion” of minds’ associated to that very state.
Now Albert and Loewer’s original proposal did not take notice of decoherence yet, but Lock-
wood (1996, p. 185; original emphasis) believed that the stability of the pointer basis might
answer the question ‘why consciousness and perception should favour the states that they do.’
Zeh (2000, p. 226; original emphasis) similarly writes that when decoherence (and branching)
take place,
[i]t is not the real world (described by a wave funtion) [sic] that branches in this
picture, but consciousness (or rather the state of its physical carrier), and with it
the observed (apparent) “world” [...].
And Wallace (2012, p. 3; original emphasis) equally describes the MWI with decoherence as
both a many-worlds and a many-minds theory, in the sense that it entails that
there are a great many versions of myself, living in surroundings much like my
own and interacting with other versions of yourself, elsewhere in physical reality.
But there is a certain problem associated with even thismany minds view, in the decoherence
based version appreciated by Lockwood, Zeh, and Wallace. This problem is that the “branches”
of the “mutliverse” are never really separated, but will always (weakly) overlap. The conscious
states associated with actual observations, however, do not overlap at all—I simply do not feel to
have perceived “spin down” the least bit when my spin measurement clearly reveals “spin up”.
Consciousness, in other words, will have to “cut o” the branches in a way that decoherence
strictly never does.
So states of consciousness will have to be added to the MWI, as they cannot be identical
with any of the (always slightly overlapping) physical states, and Albert and Loewer’s ver-
dict that ‘any many worlds interpretation which respects’ that agents can correctly access and
report their own beliefs ‘will be committed to some form of non-physicalism’ (1988, p. 206;
original emphasis) seems entirely correct. This invalidates a central virtue of the MWI, ‘that it
purports to explain how to make sense of quantum theory without adding extra equations or
interpretational postulates.’ (Kent, 2010, p. 311) But consciousness thus also receives a rather
central role for the MWI, as it is only in relation to conscious experience that the “apparent”,
“non-overlapping” worlds exist; those worlds in which we gather all evidence for QT and de-
coherence, after all.
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(a) Overlap between dierent
branches vs. non-overlapping states
of consciousness in the MWI
(b) Latently vs. dominantly manifest dispositions
Figure 1: Symbolic illustration of many worlds vs. CMDs: The “box states” in (a) indicate the
states of consciousness; the dashed line in (b) indicates the threshold of conscious perception.
Viewed by these lights, the dispositionalist account that I have suggested here thus (some-
what surprisingly) reserves a much less important role for consciousness: our conscious expe-
rience does not determine which tendency becomes amplied, it can only be used to determine
which tendency was amplied. And over repetitions of similar trials, the rates of such ampli-
cations will be approximately in accordance with the Born probabilities, since these quantify
the strength of a given propensity’s tendency to become amplied in the given environmental
conditions.
Still, my view bears resemblances to what Albert and Loewer (1988) call the single mind view
of the MWI; that when an observer  measures (say) a spinful system in a superposition of
spin up and down along some axis with (real) coecients 푐1 and 푐2 respectively, ‘the probability
that’s mind ends up believing that spin is up = 푐21 and the probability that’s mind ends up
believing that spin is down = 푐22 .’ (Albert and Loewer, 1988, p. 205)
The problems with this single mind view are numerous, for instance that as long as one
assumes that ‘when  sincerely reports that she has a denite belief about the value of 푥-
spin[...] then  does believe that the 푥-spin has a denite value’ (Albert and Loewer, 1988, p.
205), it implies that ‘mental states do not even supervene on brain states [...] since one cannot
tell from the state of a brain what its single mind believes.’ (Albert and Loewer, 1988, p. 206;
original emphasis) And it equally creates the ‘mindless hulk problem’, namely that ‘[i]f I embark
on what I take to be a conversation with my wife, how would I know, on this view, that there
was really “anyone at home”?’ (Lockwood, 1996, p. 175; original emphasis)
My dispositionalist assessment of decoherence is dierent in that I have assumed only one of
the dispositions to become amplied over the others for all conscious observers. In this way,
consciousness may supervene on the brain states (it is associated only with the dominant ones),
there will be no mindless hulks (every conscious biological organism has a conscious mind,
associated with its dominantly manifest dispositions), and, as I have explained, consciousness
does not play any fundamental role in the interpretation of the theory.
Somewhat of a weak spot remains in this connection though: nothing in the formalism –
besides maybe the very existence of dierent amplitudes and their successful interpretation in
terms of probability – really tells us that one of the dispositions will be amplied over the
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others. That I gather from experience alone, which similarly serves as a motivation for all
collapse theories.
3.2 Spooky Manifestation at a Distance?
Probably the biggest threat to my proposal is the well-known non-locality issue, which haunts
(almost) every realist interpretation of QT.12 Take a system of two spins in the singlet state|휒⟩ = 1√2 ( |↑퐿⟩ |↓푅⟩ − |↓퐿⟩ |↑푅⟩) and an EPR-Bohm type measurement performed on them (cf.
Bohm, 1951, p. 614 .). The measurement of spin 퐿 on the left hand side of the experiment will
immediately decohere the state and hence amplify, according to the present analysis, one of the
dispositions (spin up, spin down) over the other. But the decohering interaction on spin 퐿 will
immediately x the dispositions of spin 푅, even if it is at a spacelike distance and should hence
not be causally accessible, at least according to the standard reading of the relativity theories
(e.g. Taylor and Wheeler 1963, p. 39; Friedman 1983, p. 159).
To see this sort of “nonlocal inuence” in the context of decoherence more clearly, take the
entangled singlet state |휒⟩ again. Assume, further, that the interaction that is used to determine
the spin value on either side is of the Zurek-type considered above, but that in the “laboratory
frame” it rst happens on the left hand side only.13 This means that before the interaction, the
total state will be |Ψ⟩ = 1√2( |↑퐿⟩ |↓푅⟩ − |↓퐿⟩ |↑푅⟩ ) |0,퐿⟩ |0,푅⟩ , (5)
and the Hamiltonian will be of the form퐻̂int,푅 = 12 휎̂푧 ⊗ 1 ,푅 ⊗ 푁∑푖=1 휇푖휎̂ (푖)푧 ⨂푗≠푖 1푗 ⊗ 1 ,푅 , (6)
with obvious meanings of the symbols. Notably, I have here assumed the two environments on
the left and on the right to be factorizing, meaning that they can be thought of as being entirely
disjoint. The unitary evolution will then eect the change푈̂ |Ψ⟩ = 1√2( |↑퐿⟩ |↓푅⟩ |1,퐿(푡)⟩ − |↓퐿⟩ |↑푅⟩ |2,퐿(푡)⟩ ) |0,푅⟩ , (7)
where |1,퐿(푡)⟩ and |2,퐿(푡)⟩ are dened in analogy to the decohering environmental states
in eq. (3). Now since |0,푅⟩ remains completely unchanged, tracing out both left and right
environments will lead to the state휌̂퐿,푅 (푡) = 12 |↑퐿⟩⟨↑퐿| ⊗ |↓푅⟩⟨↓푅 | + 12 |↓퐿⟩⟨↓퐿| ⊗ |↑푅⟩⟨↑푅 |− 12푑(푡) |↑퐿⟩⟨↓퐿| ⊗ |↓푅⟩⟨↑푅 | − 12푑 ∗(푡) |↓퐿⟩⟨↑퐿| ⊗ |↑푅⟩⟨↓푅 | , (8)
12I say ‘almost’ because here the MWI indeed has a major advantage: the genesis of the quantum correlations
reduces entirely to the impressions of observers in a “quantum multiverse”, in virtue of their local interactions
(cf. Albert and Loewer, 1988, p. 210). All of this, of course, notwithstanding the problems of talking about
probability (and hence: correlation) and consciousness in the MWI in the rst place.
13I will also assume the two particles which are entangled in spin-space to be distinguishable, so that I can disregard
considerations of entanglement in position space (cf. Ghirardi et al., 2002, p. 63).
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which looks almost exactly like the state in (4), but for two correlated systems and with the
particular choice 훼 = −훽 = 2−1/2.
If we apply the suggested dispositionalist interpretation and assume that 푑(푡) vanishes suf-
ciently fast, we have the result that one of the two propensities becomes almost immediately
amplied on the right hand side as well, namely that anti-aligned to the one on the right hand
side—even though the relevant environments were assumed to be perfectly disjoint. This seems ex-
actly like the causal sort of dependence between the two outcomes that has riddled the debate
for so long.
Now a lot has been written on this topic, far too much to be seriously covered in this paper.
I will hence indulge in some cherry picking to outline a way to deal with this diculty in the
dispositionalist proposal.
Basically, there are three main options for a causal account of the situation (e.g. Suárez, 2004;
Näger, 2016): (i) the outcomes directly inuence each other causally, (ii) the distant setting (of
the measuring device and environmental conditions) causally inuences the local outcome, or
(iii) there is a (hidden) common cause for the correlation.
Now as regards options (i) and (ii), a result by Näger (2013) suggests that dependence on both
settings needs to be assumed to avoid the derivation of a Bell-type inequality. This is unprob-
lematic in principle for the dispositionalist: The local environment, featuring also the “setting
conditions”, will obviously gure in the local manifestation; and that the remote environment
will apparently exert an inuence as well has already been acknowledged. Nevertheless, the
causation would be superluminal, and hence imply daunting consequences like the in-principle
possibility of causal loops.
Option (iii) has been suggested e.g. by Mittelstaedt (1998) and Näger (2016). While Näger
(cf. 2016, p. 1148) appeals to the traditional collapse-vocabulary,14 Mittelstaedt (1998, p. 158;
emphasis added) allows that ‘the environment acts – as a common cause [...] – and provides
simultaneously the objectication’ of two spin observables’ values along the same axis and on
opposite arms of the experiment.
Näger (2016, p. 1128; original emphasis), however, points out that ‘the measurement statistics
of entangled quantum objects (which violate Bell inequalities) is per se in conict with usual
principles of causal explanation’, i.e. ‘even if one disregards all spatiotemporal constraints[.]’
And the environment too is subject to this constraint, when construed as a common cause.
To see this more clearly take, in particular, the time evolved quantum state 휌̂퐿,푅 (푡) in which
the environment on the left hand side has exerted its inuence, and is assumed to have caused
both measurable correlated values. Then we have푝(↑퐿, ↓푅 |휌̂퐿,푅 (푡)) = tr( |↑퐿⟩⟨↑퐿| ⊗ |↓푅⟩⟨↓푅 | 휌̂퐿,푅 (푡)) = 12 > 14 == tr( |↑퐿⟩⟨↑퐿| ⊗ 1 ,푅 휌̂퐿,푅 (푡)) tr(1 ,퐿 ⊗ |↓푅⟩⟨↓푅 | 휌̂퐿,푅 (푡))= 푝(↑퐿 |휌̂퐿,푅 (푡))푝(↓푅 |휌̂퐿,푅 (푡)).
Construed as a common cause of the amplications, the environment would, in other words,
violate Reichenbach’s “screening-o”-condition (1965, p. 165 .), a principle at the heart (in
some version or other) of formal theories of causation (e.g. Wroński 2014; Spirtes et al. 2000,
14...which, to recall, may not be compatible with decoherence (cf. Schlosshauer, 2004, pp. 1294 .).
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p. 29). Long story short: if we think of the relation between the two manifestation events
as causal, this would violate the causal constraints implied by the relativity theories and the
probabilisitic-causal constraints of standard accounts of probabilistic causation.
There is a recent proposal by Gebharter and Retzla (unpublished) that I believe can be
exploited to remove the tension within the parameters of my dispositionalist account. Gebhar-
ter and Retzla, namely, suggest that correlations like these could be understood in virtue of
‘common cause triggered non-causal dependencies’ (their pp. 26 .), i.e. that there is a common
cause of the two correlated events (something which brings them into existence), but that the
correlation is explained not in virtue of this common cause, but rather in terms of a nomological
connection between them.
This idea can be put in the service of my dispositionalist account as follows: while the in-
teraction with the environment causes the two systems’ dispositions to manifest, the precise
dynamics of states, amplitudes, and associated probabilities are then determined purely by the
interaction Hamiltonian, i.e. nomologically. Which dispositions will manifest with what fre-
quency in repeated trials is xed by the Born rule, i.e. nomologically as well. In this sense the
quantum correlations are triggered by a common cause (the environment) while being deter-
mined by laws of nature (the unitary dynamics and Born’s rule, read in terms of propensities).
So no ‘spooky actions at a distance’ (Einstein, 1947, p. 157; emphasis added) after all.
Notably, there is now no problem with special relativity on any level anymore, insofar as the
relevant interaction (given by some Lagrangian) is Lorentz covariant: the correlation is ensured
by a Lorentz covariant law and triggered by the dispositional prole of the joint quantum state.
The state in turn acts as a common cause of there even being any measured values in the rst
place, which lies in the join of the past light cones of both detection events.
4 Summary and Outlook
In this paper I have provided an interpretation of QT and decoherence in terms of the manifesta-
tions of dispositions, thereby building on ideas that date back to Heisenberg’s early interpretive
eorts. My main suggestion was that decoherence should be understood in the sense of a mu-
tual manifestation of dispositions in virtue of the interactions between the systems they pertain
to. This manifestation would be gradual, in the sense of Hüttemann’s CMDs, which allows that
systems can be literally more or less localized, and have a more or less denite momentum at the
same time. To read the formalism somewhat literally (and not introduce a collapse postulate
after all), I introduced the notion of dominant manifestation, which would mean that all values
of some observable would manifest on a system in consequence of a suitable interaction, but
that only one of them would become amplied to such a degree that it would lead to observ-
able behavior. The remainder I referred to as eectively latent. The Born rule-weights I took to
quantify the strength of a disposition’s tendency to become dominantly manifest. One might
think of this in terms of a resource (‘actuality’) for which the values compete, in such a way
that shares will be distributed unequally.15
My account has several merits: Unlike some other realist interpretations, it appreciates the
15Viewed by these lights, this suggests a way to make quite literal sense of Zurek’s (2009) notion of ‘Quantum
Darwinism’.
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importance of decoherence right away; unlike the MWI it appreciates the central role of the
Born rule right away, but does not have to reserve a special role for consciousness. It can make
sense of observation, including such things as recoherence, while allowing that minds may
supervene on brains and avoiding such things as mindless hulks.
However, some drawbacks or open questions remain: There is nothing in the formalism
which corresponds directly to the selective amplication at stake; this is gathered rather from
our successful practice of using the Born probabilities, and the experience of single outcomes.
And there is the murky business of non-local inuences, which haunts most realist interpre-
tations. This can be dealt with by viewing the relation between the correlated outcomes as
nomological, not causal; but strictly speaking, this in turn implies the need to provide an ac-
count of the laws of nature compatible with a non-causal reading.
I do not think that these are fatal aws or insurmountable diculties. Hence I suggest that
a propensity-interpretation along the lines suggested above is an option that deserves more
attention than it presently enjoys.
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